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Abstract
This article attempts to relate to literature insights on the role of sensory and motor
processes as essential constituents of cognition. It concentrates on the representation
of emotion. The starting-point of the investigation is the fact that the representation
of emotion in literature is – analogous to emotion in actual life – essentially consti-
tuted by motion and other physical or physiological manifestations. The investigation
is supported by cognitive research and by neuroscientic research concerning the interde-
pendence of emotion and motion. Evidence is adduced that emotional experiences are
in a great quantity of literary texts represented as cognitive experiences with a strong
participation of kinesthetic activities of the body.
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1 Introduction
Cognitive science has recently had such a strong impact on literary studies that one
can speak of a cognitive revolution in the scholarly treatment of literature (Stockwell,
2002). The new concept of embodied cognition or grounded cognition, which accords
the body a central role in shaping the mind (Wilson 2002, Barsalou: 2008, 2010), has,
however, not yet found reverberations in literary studies. Embodied cognition is an
extraordinarily wide concept. It means that the areas in the brain which activate the
body and those which are involved in processing reason and linguistic meaning work
interdependently. (Wilson, 2002, Mahon/Caramazza, 2008) In fact, an embodied theory
of meaning seems to take shape which relates the meaning of words and sentences to
bodily action. (See for instance Glenberg and Paschak, 2002)
The present article1 is a new departure in that it attempts to relate to literature in-
sights on the role of sensory and motor processes as essential constituents of cognition.
1 I am indebted for valuable help and inspiration to my Jena colleagues Doreen Triebel, Dirk Vanderbeke and
Oliver Bock. For whatever may be open to criticism in this study they are not responsible.
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(Pezullo et al., 2011) The notion of sensory-motor processes is comprehensive, since it
includes, on the one hand, gestural, facial aspects and other movements of the body,
and, on the other hand, phenomena such as smelling, tasting and hearing. It is not
always possible to treat these processes separately. The following contribution con-
centrates on emotion, which has been a quite prominent topic in cognitive studies for
the last two decades. (Hogan, 2010, p. 237) It attempts to show that writers of Vctional
literature seem to have had a notion of embodied cognition long before the term was
created. A basis for applying sensory-motor concepts to literature as a product of the
imagination is that “imagining and doing use a shared neural substrate” (Gallese/LakoU,
2005, p. 456), i. e. when one imagines seeing something, the same parts of the brain
are used as when one actually sees. Or when we imagine that we are moving, some
of the same parts of the brain are used as when we actually move. Movement, per-
ceived on a screen or represented in a text, may cause cognitive processing analogous
to real-life movement. This notion can even be extended to the use of metaphors. It
has been shown that not only actual and imagined physical activities, but also physi-
cal events evoked in metaphors (LakoU/Johnson, 1999, Schrott, Jacobs, 211) and idioms
(Boulenger, Hauk, Pulvermüller, 2008) can be related to the motor cortex. The whole
development in philosophy and psychology from Descartes’ dualism of res cogitans and
res extensa to modern views of the interconnectedness of body and mind in Antonio
Damasio’s reference to the “embodied mind” (Damasio, 1984, 1999) or Matthew Rat-
cliUe’s understanding of feelings as “bodily states” (RatcliUe, 2008), which provides a
cultural context for recent advances in cognitive science, cannot be treated within the
frame of this article. If certain developments in the philosophy and psychology of feel-
ing lead to concepts which come close to what is called embodied cognition in cognitive
science, this contribution will discuss literature as another signiVcant area of cultural
production which can be related to the context of embodied cognition.
2 Motion and Emotion
The starting-point of the following investigation is the fact that the representation of
emotion in literature is – analogous to emotion in actual life – essentially constituted
by motion and other physical or physiological manifestations. The etymology of the
word is already signiVcant. Emotion is derived from the French verb émouvoir, which is
based on Latin emovere – in the Latin verb the preposition “e“ means "without"/”out of”
and movere means "move“. The connection of the phenomenon of emotion with motion
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is ubiquitous in general language use, as the following randomly chosen metaphorical
words and phrases show: “Gefühlsbewegung”, “revulsion of feeling”, “he fell in love”,
“he fell into a depression”, “his heart started pounding when he saw her”.
Before starting our investigation, at least one piece of evidence from neuroscience
for relating emotion and motion will be adduced to support our procedure by cognitive
research. A team of researchers from Cambridge and Berlin made experiments on
18 persons, using magnetic resonance imaging to compare brain activation evoked by
emotion words to that evoked by face- and arm-related action words. (Moseley, 2011)
The result was that emotion words evoked activity in the motor brain systems. That
means that emotion words activate the motor system in a way comparable to action
words. So the attempt to correlate emotion and motion is corroborated by Vndings
of neuroscience. For what holds true for actual reality can also be taken granted for
imagined reality.
If we look at the representation of emotion in literature, we notice that it is, as
is the case in actual reality, essentially constituted by motion and other physical or
physiological manifestations. This holds true for visual art, too, as Edvard Munch’s
painting “The Scream” shows.
Edvard Munch, The Scream 1893, National Gallery, Oslo
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The hands of the screaming person are elongated and pressed tightly to the head. The
mouth is wide open; so are the eyes, empty and unfocussed. The person is not actually
in motion. The painting shows a face freezed with horror, which is the result of a
movement, which is also reWected in the landscape. Munch’s work is an outstanding
example of the visual representation of embodied emotion. However, we must be aware
of the fact that the painting is a work of art, of great art at that, and not what cognitivists
would normally study. It transcends what is accessible to scientiVc experiments. But
it is based on a principle on which many modern scientiVc theories of emotion are
founded, namely that emotion is largely manifested in the body.
3 Facial Feedback in Narrative Prose
Textual analysis will begin by examining the representation of facial and other physical
activity in narrative prose in relation to emotion. Cognitivists like Adelman and Zajonc
interested in the phenomenon of emotion have emphasized “the role of emotional facial
action in the subjective experience of emotion” (Adelman, 1989, p. 249). Adelman avoids
‘the convention of referring to emotional facial action as “expression” since this term
imposes an a priori theory, implying that emotional facial action (facial eUerence) has its
major role in the manifestation of internal states.’ (Adelman, 1989, pp. 249–250). While
I agree with Adelman and Zajonc in avoiding subjectivist and expressionist theories, I
take the liberty of using, at times, the term “facial (or bodily) manifestation” rather than
“facial eUerence” (“eUerent”, ‘carrying or conducting outwards from a part or an organ
of the body, esp. from the brain or spinal cord’).
Before looking at the representation of facial manifestation in literature, attention
will be drawn to a famous experiment carried out by Fritz Strack (1967) which is rel-
evant to our argument. This is the so-called pen experiment which proves the facial
feedback hypothesis from a scientiVc perspective. Subjects had to hold a pen in their
mouth in ways that either inhibited or facilitated the muscles usually associated with
smiling. Holding a pen with the teeth only was considered a facilitating condition since
it involved the muscles active in smiling; holding a pen with the lips only was consid-
ered an inhibiting condition, since it did not involve or, rather, inhibited the muscles
associated with smiling. Subjects who had the pen between their teeth showed more
intense humour responses, when cartoons were presented to them, than subjects who
had the pen between the lips. The question of the quality of the response – aUective
or cognitive – cannot be discussed here. (See Dem 1967.)
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Narrative texts in which a great amount of bodily and facial activity is represented are
novels of the Thirties and the Forties of the last century (Dashiell Hammett, Raymond
Chandler, Ernest Hemingway etc.), which I some time ago termed the behavioristic
novel (Müller 1981). In this kind of narration the representation tends to leave out
internal description and concentrate on outward physical manifestation, i. e. on what
cognitivists call facial and bodily feedback. Here is an example from Hammett’s novel
The Glass Key (1931):
(1) When he [Ned Beaumont] rose from the telephone he was smiling with pale lips.
His eyes were shiny and reckless. His hands shook a little. (Hammett, 1975, p. 127)
That physical activity suggests emotion in these sentences is indicated by the ref-
erence to the character’s smile and by his “reckless” eyes. Yet what he really thinks
remains unstated. It may be a challenge to the reader to reconstruct his undisclosed
thoughts along the lines of the theory of mind. (Zunshine, 2006) Our capacity for mind
reading can be in demand if we are confronted with real people just as with literary
Vgures. We may encounter analogous situations in real life and in the Vctional world
of the screen or the book. When a person’s gestural and facial activity goes without
words we have to perform a cognitive achievement. An example from one of Raymond
Chandler’s novels, which are told by the I-narrator Philip Marlowe, represents the body
action of a person, who has committed body-stripping, from the narrator’s perspec-
tive. The following quotations have been collected from the scene in question, in which
pressure is put on the character by the narrator:
(2) Tiny beads of sweat showed on Flack’s lip above his little moustache. – He hunched
down in a chair and stared at the corner of the desk. After a long time, he sighed. –
His eyes were small and thoughtful. His tongue pushed out over his lower lip. –
I stopped and watched the faint glisten of moisture forming on his forehead. He
swallowed hard. His eyes were sick. – He just sat there and stared at me with
his nasty little eyes half closed and his nasty little moustache shining. One of his
hands twitched on the desk, an aimless movement. (Chandler, The Little Sister,
1975, Chapter 11)
The emotions of the character remain unspeciVed. The representation is restricted to
outward physical manifestation. Yet the eUect on the reader is to perceive, in a cognitive
act, the character as extremely uncomfortable. Nor is the narrator’s response explicitly
communicated. His attitude of distaste and contempt is only suggested by the dinginess
and meanness of the described person and by the adjective “nasty” which is applied to
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the eyes and moustache. The representation of his own facial activity as a response is
not possible for the narrator, for the text is written in the form of I-narration. Yet it is
astonishing to what extent the narrator applies description of physical details also to
his own body, as the two following examples show:
(3) I grinned suddenly, bent over and quickly and with the grin still on my face, out of
place as it was, pulled oU Dr. Hambleton’s toupee [. . .] (Chandler, 1975, The Little
Sister, Chapter 9)
(4) Then I put it [the telephone] down very slowly and looked at the hand that held it.
It was half open and clenched stiU, as it was holding the instrument. (Chandler,
1975, The Lady in the Lake, Chapter 28)
In the Vrst quotation the narrator describes even a facial manifestation – grinning,
the grin on his face –, which he cannot see. For the explication of more complicated
examples we have to refer to the concepts of mirror neurons and theory of mind. To do
so in a graphic way we will Vrst look at a painting which refers to a complex situation of
interfacial response, Nicolas Poussin, “Landscape with a Man Killed by a Snake“ (1648).
The reason for the shift of our argument to another art medium is that an interfacial
phenomenon is, in this ocular form, easier to grasp and interpret.
Nicolas Poussin, Landscape with a Man Killed by a Snake 1648, The National Gallery, London
This painting, which has been characterized as a “study in fear” and has been used
as a cover image for Richard Wollheim’s book On the Emotions (1999), reproduces an
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emotionally disturbing scene in an apparently serene Arcadian landscape. At the bot-
tom of the left-hand side a man is being killed by a snake. From the right side a young
man with terriVed, pain-distorted face, turned to the spectator, is Weeing from the place
of the accident. The emotional stress represented in the face is unfortunately not to be
seen clearly enough in the reproduction of the painting, which is exhibited in in the Na-
tional Gallery in London. In the middle of the painting there is a woman, who from her
position cannot perceive the place of the accident. But her face and posture assumes the
same pained appearance as the man’s. Her agitation is also shown in her wild gestures
and her forward-bending posture. She may be screaming. If she were a real person,
we would have to say that her motor cortex has been activated most strongly by the
running man she is seeing.
Poussin leaves the accident itself almost in the dark. The painting’s emphasis is on
the emotions reWected in the faces of the two other Vgures. The fact that the woman,
though not knowing the reason for the man’s fear, shows the same physical evidence
of fear as the man, can be, from a contemporary scientiVc vantage-point, explained by
the theory of mirror neurons. This theory, which I referred to earlier in this paper, is
based on the empirically gained insight – Vrst derived from the observation of mon-
keys – that the same parts of the brain are active when a person performs an action as
when the person sees another individual performing the same action. (Rizzolatti: 1999,
2526–2528) This phenomenon can be explained in terms of the facial feedback theory. It
would also be possible to explain Poussin’s scene of facial interaction in terms of the
theory-of-mind concept.2 This would mean that the woman in the painting, looking at
the frightened face of the man, forms an idea of what he feels and feels the same by
way of empathy, as her facial aspect indicates. In fact, in a recent article on face-to-
face interactions Martin Schulte-Rüther et al. (2007) applied both the Mirror Neuron
Theory and the Theory of Mind to face-to-face interaction. I personally would prefer
to describe the scene in the painting under discussion as face-to-face interaction with
embodied cognition on the part of the woman. She empathizes with the man on account
of the pain manifested in his face, the empathy causing motor activity. That mind read-
ing and cognition belong together is stated by Alan Richardson’s following quotation:
“What’s termed our ‘theory of mind’ [. . .] would be greatly impoverished if we did not
have a reasonably reliable, and therefor largely unconscious, cognitive mechanism for
gauging the emotions and intentions of others through reading their faces.” (Richardson
2010: 65)
2 This was suggested to me by my colleague Dirk Vanderbeke.
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Let us now look at two passages in Raymond Chandler’s novel The Little Sister, where
the protagonist realizes his emotional state only by looking at himself in a mirror:
(5) Passing the open door of the wash cabinet I saw a stiU excited face in the glass.
I went over to the wash-basin and washed my hands and face. I sloshed cold water
on my face and dried it oU hard with the towel and looked at it in the mirror.
‘You drove oU a cliU all right,’ I said.
(Chandler, 1975, The Little Sister, Chapter 23)
(6) I got up and went to the built-in wardrobe and looked at my face in the Wawed
mirror. It had a strained look. I’d been living too fast. (Chandler, 1975, The Little
Sister, p. 133)
These examples may be a far cry away from Lacan’s theory of the mirror phase in
which the child for the Vrst time succeeds in recognizing and identifying him/herself as
a complete self in front of a mirror, but the look of the protagonist at himself in a mirror
in the novel by Chandler also has a cognitive function. In the passages quoted the
narrator Vnds out something about himself by looking at himself. In the Vrst example
the narrator even talks to his face. It would be problematic to apply the mirror neuron
concept to self-perception in the two passages, for one would have to assume self-
division in the observer, in which one part of the self observes the other part, although
a dual self is indicated in the Vrst quotation, which refers to “a stiU excited face” and not
to “my stiU excited face”. The protagonist even addresses his face. The two examples
could be explained as special instances of the theory of mind applied to a character
Vnding out something about his person by looking at himself in a mirror. However,
more plausible would be the reference to Daryl Bem’s “self-perception theory”. This
theory explains that people form new attitudes and beliefs, including those related to
the self, from observing their own behavior. Bem (1967) maintains that people deduce
their own internal states, like attitudes and emotions via the same processes by which
they deduce the internal states and dispositions of others. SpeciVcally, Bem assumes
that people use their facial expressions as a source of information to infer their own
attitudes. This is what happens in the two quotes in which Philip Marlowe looks at
his own face in the mirror. Before the mirror the character comes to self-perception
and partially also to conclusions concerning the state of his mind. Be that as it may,
in the context of sensory motor concepts the novels by Hammett and Chandler provide
abundant evidence of embodied cognition.
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4 Emotion as Cognition I: An Example from Narrative Prose
As for emotion, I am making a wide claim, namely to postulate that emotional expe-
riences, whether actual or imaginary, are cognitive events, to which sensory motor pro-
cesses contribute essentially. A similar position has been taken by Meyer-Sickendieck
(2012) who regards the perception of moods as cognitive acts which have a profound ef-
fect on the body. Physical manifestations like the body shaking, the heart beating faster,
eyes being averted and facial expressions like smiling or tears are more than” physio-
logical accompaniments”, as Oately states (Oately, 1994, p. 53, Oately, 1992. p. 20–21),
but, looked at in the context of the present project, they are part and parcel of cogni-
tion. In this respect the approach taken here diUers from Raymond Gibbs’ important
chapter on emotion (Gibbs, 2005, pp. 239–274), which focuses on consciousness rather
than cognition. I can, however, not refer to empirical evidence for substantiating my
assumptions concerning the representation of emotion in literature. Meyer-Sickendieck
pursues such an empirical project, as he declares in the conclusion of his book, but his
methodology does not seem to reach the precision of brain scientists. As a literary critic
I have to rely on literary texts. Since poetic language does not diUer radically from ev-
eryday language and since poetic language frequently evinces linguistic features which
are a heightened form of normal speech, my examples may perhaps be not without
relevance for linguists and cognitive scientists.
I will begin with an example of narrative prose, a passage from William Faulkner’s
novel Light in August, which deals with the fate of a white African-American:
(7) He turned into [the street] running and plunged up the sharp ascent, his heart
hammering, and into the higher street. He stopped here, panting, glaring, his
heart thudding as if it could not or would not yet believe that the air was now the
cold hard air of white people. (Faulkner, 1971, p. 88)
Here physical action emerges as emotion, be it fear or revulsion. While running
from a district of blacks to a district of whites, the protagonist passes through diUerent
emotional states. As frantic as he may be, he is aware of what happens. The passage
represents motion and emotion and cognition in an insoluble conjunction. Emotion is
motion, as the pounding heart indicates. The passage can be regarded as an extreme
literary example of embodied cognition, in which the sensory-motor component goes
together with cognition.
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5 Emotion as Cognition II: Examples from Romantic Poetry
Romantic lyric poetry represents, on the whole, a strongly subjective and intimate form
of discourse which with its orientation on the individual self tends to be at variance
with the socially established systems of discourse which, according to Niklas Luhmann
(Liebe als Passion, 1982), inWuence linguistic and literary representation. It may be
objected that it makes no sense to approach this kind of poetry, which is to a large extent
characterized by interiority, from the point of view of the sensory-motor concept. I will
try and show that such an objection would not be justiVed. My analysis begins with
a look at a notoriously emotional poem, which has a curious aspect that had puzzled
me for a long time until I looked at it in terms of the sensory-motor concept. It is Percy
B. Shelley’s “The Indian Serenade”. In this poem it is intense emotion which makes
the lover “arise from dreams” of his beloved and forces him to her chamber-window.
Emotion inevitably concurs with motion. The speaker declares that it is a “spirit in my
feet” which leads him to her window:
(8) And a spirit in my feet
Hath led me – who knows how?
To thy chamber window, Sweet! (Shelley, 1970, p. 500)
The puzzling phrase in this poem is “a spirit in my feet”. For a neuroscientist it
may seem absurd or downright silly to locate a “spirit” in a foot. But it is interesting
that Shelley, who could not know anything about neuroscience, felt the need for a
physical source or agency which caused the action of his lover, a source interestingly
diUerent from the heart which would in the cardiocentric tradition (Niemeier 2011) be
responsible for a lover’s action. The heart or the soul is, at least in this poem, not the
seat of the feelings. Nowadays we would of course retrace the source of the lover’s
motion in the poem to his brain. In want of any such concept the foot had to serve
as a kind of substitute. The passage explicitly illustrates a coincidence of emotion and
motion with cognitive implications. Cognition is involved in the self-observation and
the self-description of the poems’ speaker.
The following quotations from romantic poems provide evidence for the hypothesis
that emotion tends to be represented as cognition and to be embodied in motion in the
poetry of the age. Lines like –
(9) I die! I faint! I fail (“Indian Serenade”, Shelley, 1970, p. 580)
(10) I pant, I sink, I tremble, I expire! (Epipsychidion, Shelley, 1970, p. 424)
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(11) My heart aches, and a drowsy numbness pains
My sense, as though of hemlock I had drunk,
Or emptied some dull opiate to the drains
One minute past and Lethe-wards had sunk:
[. . .] (“Ode to a Nightingale”, 1–4, Keats, 1970, p. 207)
– have traditionally been called subjective or self-expressive. The most important repre-
sentative of a poetics of expression which accounts for such texts, emphasizing notions
of subjectivity and expressiveness, is M. H. Abrams’ famous book The Mirror and the
Lamp (1953). In the light of sensory-motor concepts such poems should rather be called
self-diagnostic or self-reWexive. It is signiVcant that in all these examples emotion co-
incides with motion. Emotion manifests itself in physical terms or, more precisely, in
motion. This is the case even in the lines from Keats’ ode, although the depressed state
of having “sunk” down is described only on a metaphorical level. Poetry intensiVes here
what we have noted above with reference to everyday language, namely that emotional
states are frequently expressed in physical terms, for example in words like “downcast”
(German “niedergeschlagen”) or “spurred” (German “beWügelt”). Keats is, incidentally,
one of the greatest diagnosticians in English poetry, which reWects his deep interest in
medicine and new ideas in brain anatomy and neurophysiology. (Richardson 2010: 75)
Here is another example. In “Ode on a Grecian Urn” the “happy” world depicted on the
urn is described, which is far above “all breathing human passion”
(12) That leaves a heart high-sorrowful and cloy’d,
A burning forehead, and a parching tongue. (Keats, 1970, p. 210)
The lines refer to an emotion of extreme sorrow, but the terms in which it is rep-
resented are intensely physical or sensory, almost in the form of a medical diagnosis.
Self-description is intensiVed to the point of self-diagnosis: the heart is sickened, the
forehead burning, and the tongue dried out. The great amount of physical manifestation
in these and many more cases is a testimony of cognition rather merely accompaniment
of it.
In order to point at the recipient’s side of an embodied understanding of emotion
I will quote a passage from the poet A. E. Housman’s famous lecture The Name and
Nature of Poetry in which he equates the emotional eUect of poetry with a physical one:
(13) Experience has taught me, when I am shaving of a morning, to keep watch over
my thoughts, because, if a line of poetry strays into my memory, my skins bristles
so that the razor ceases to act. This particular symptom is accompanied by a shiver
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down the spine; there is another which consists in a constriction of the throat and
a precipitation of water to the eyes: and there is a third which I can only describe
by borrowing a phrase from one of Keats’s last letters, where he says, speaking of
Fanny Brawne, ‘everything that reminds me of her goes through my like a spear’.
The seat of this sensation is the pit of the stomach. (Housman, 1933, p. 47)
This is an extreme example of the eUect of poetry caused by emotions which react
on the body in a multitude of ways from a bristling of the skin to the sense of being
penetrated by a spear in the pit of the stomach. The importance of the physical side in
the representation of emotions, which is emphasized in my argument, could be supple-
mented by investigations of the production and the reception side of the poetic process,
which is not possible within the frame of this article.
6 Embodied Cognition in a Modern Poem
The lyrical poems dealt with so far have been taken from romantic poetry. To give just a
glimpse of embodied cognition, which continues to emerge, in varied forms, in later po-
etry, at least one twentieth-century poem will be adduced. In this context the study by
Burkhard Meyer-Sickendiek has to be referred again, Lyrisches Gespür. Vom geheimen
Sensorium moderner Poesie. (2012). Meyer-Sickendiek is strongly interested in the lyric
representation of fugitive moods which are barely felt out by a sensitive subject and he
discusses the corporeality of perception. His theoretical approach, which is focused on
mood (“Stimmung”) rather than feeling, is related to the New Phenomenology of Her-
mann Schmitz. It provides the basis for extremely subtle analyses. Although it does not
refer to sensory-motor concepts, it ties in with the present study, since it understands
the apprehension of a mood (“das Erspüren einer Stimmung”) as a cognitive act. The
poem to be looked at here is by William Carlos Williams:
(14) To a Poor Old Woman
munching a plum on
the street a paper bag
of them in her hand
They taste good to her
They taste good
to her. They taste
good to her
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You can see it by
the way she gives herself
to the one half
sucked out in her hand
Comforted by
a solace of ripe plums
seeming to Vll the air
They taste good to her
(Williams, 1951, p. 99)
In this poem there is a total focus on the woman who is eating plums with the great-
est relish, even sucking the fruit from her hand. Her feelings of sensuous pleasure are
denoted by the statement “They taste good to her”. Even the last stanza, which artic-
ulates a kind of epiphany, is concentrated on smell and taste. In the second stanza it is
the device of repetition with the shifting of the line ends within the repeated sentence, –
an intricate counterpointing of syntax and meter – which has an iconic and intensify-
ing eUect. The shifting enjambment mimes the process of munching and savouring the
plums. The notion of embodied feeling is here expressed by a distinct poetic technique –
repetition. The last stanza conveys a sense of satisfaction which transcends the limits
of the object beheld. Emotion words refer to sensuous contentedness ("Comforted / a
solace of ripe plums") and an impression of the air being Vlled with the smell of plums
("seeming to Vll the air") is evoked. There is also a cognitive component in the woman’s
pleasure. She obviously knows what she is doing and she enjoys what she is doing, as
it is suggested by the repeated clause, “They taste good to her”. The poem is an interest-
ing case in that in addition to the visual dimension it includes the senses of tasting and
smelling. Its imagery is multisensory. (Starr, 2010) It is one of the purest examples of
embodied feeling in poetry.
7 Emotion Manifested in Kinetic Body Metaphors
From a cognitive point of view there is hardly a diUerence between metaphor in general
and in literary language. LakoU and Johnson argue that human thought and speech are
constructed metaphorically from the basic kinesthetic experiences of living in a body
(Crane 2010: 104). In an illuminating experiment Boulanger, Hauk and Pulvermüller
(2009) could show that idioms – which contain action metaphors like “grasping the
idea” – activate the motor cortex just as non-Vgurative expressions referring to action
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do. Their conclusion is that “Motor systems of the brain, including motor and premotor
cortex, and the motor cognitions they process appear to be central for understanding
idioms.” (Boulanger, Hauk and Pulvermüller 2008: 1913) Metaphors which refer to mo-
tions of the body like
(15) My blood freezes – I could vomit – He fell into a tumult of contradictory feelings –
Grasping ideas requires some intelligence
are not radically diUerent from metaphors in poetry. The most important diUerence
seems to be that poetic metaphors usually strive for the quality of novelty or originality.
It can be said that metaphor is a supreme device of expressing emotion in poetry. It is
in fact a catalyst of emotion. Also in this context the relation between motion and
emotion, which is our topic, is particularly frequent, as the poems quoted above show.
Further evidence is provided by the following examples from Gerard Manley Hopkins’
so-called terrible sonnets (Poems 65 and 67):
(16) No worst, there is none. Pitched past pitch of grief,
More pangs will, schooled at forepangs, wilder wring. (Hopkins, 1967, p. 100)
(17) Selfyeast of spirit a dull dough sours. (Hopkins, 1967, p. 101)
(18) I am gall, I am heartburn. God’s most deep decree
Bitter would have me taste: my taste was me;
Bones built in me, Wesh Vlled, blood brimmed the curse. (Hopkins, 1967, p. 101)
In each of these instances extreme emotions are rendered in physical terms: in the
Vrst case spiritual pain manifests itself physically in terms of wringing pangs, in the
second the self’s spiritual helplessness is expressed by the image of the leaven of the
self, unable to raise a dough, and in the third metaphors of taste are used to express
the emotional state of the self, which is, in the absence of God, thrown back on itself
and has to taste itself. It should not be forgotten that these are written or rather printed
words, condensed dust on the page, if you do not read them aloud, and yet there is
an enormous sense of physicality to them;3 the body as the testimony of emotions
is powerfully present, for, as we have argued, the respective areas of the brain are
activated regardless of their metaphorical character. At the same time Hopkins’ lines
evince great self-awareness and self-perception on the part of the speaker. Again I
3 I am aware that reading a poem silently also has a sensory quality. If this was not the case, sound eUects
and the rhythmical quality of the poem would remain unnoticed. The exploration of this phenomenon
would be another challenge of cognitive research.
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would not like to call such poetic discourse self-expression. On account of its strong
cognitive quality I would prefer the term self-deVnition or self-diagnosis.
8 A Note on Embodied Cognition in Literature and the
Historical Aspect – Shakespeare
The examples adduced for embodied cognition in the context of the representation of
emotion have been taken from nineteenth and twentieth-century literature. The tex-
tual corpus should, of course, be extended to earlier literature, and it should be asked
whether historical developments can be identiVed in the treatment of the relation of
emotion and motion in literature. A Vrst impression gained during the research for this
study is that a climax of embodied cognition and emotion is to be found in the literature
of the romantic period. However, is evident that further historical research and an ex-
pansion of the corpus are needed. Petrarch’s Canzoniere, for instance, one of the most
important models for lyric production all over Europe, has explicit descriptions of feel-
ings in physical terms such as the lover’s freezing and burning in his changing moods.
It would certainly be fruitful to look at Petrarch and his tradition or at metaphysical
poetry with respect to embodied feeling and cognition, but I would like to have just a
brief look at Shakespeare, who in this, as in so many other aspects, proves to be quite
modern. Darwin quotes him as one of the chief authorities on human expression. (Alan
Richardson 2010: 71) There is no room to go into Mary Thomas Crane’s important study
on conceptual metaphors in Shakespeare’s Brain. (2000) First, two lines from Hamlet’s
Vrst soliloquy are to be quoted:
(19) O that this too sullied Wesh would melt,
Thaw, and resolve itself into a dew,
(Shakespeare 2005, p. 113, Act I, Scene 2, ll. 129–30)
Hamlet’s disillusionment with his family and his self-loathing are manifested in phys-
ical terms, in his desire for his body to melt away. The protagonist does not in the Vrst
place refer to his feelings of depression, but his psycho-physical condition. Hamlet’s
world-weariness manifests itself in a desire for the dissolution of his body. Another
example is Macbeth, who contemplates murder to gain the crown, yet is so terriVed by
fear that the image of murder unsettles his bodily functions,
(20) [. . .] why do I yield to that suggestion
Whose horrid image doth unVx my hair,
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And make my seated heart knock at my ribs,
Against the use of nature? (Shakespeare, 1971, p. 21, Act I, Scene 3, ll. 134–37)
Here again the image of the body’s life, with the hair standing on end and the heart
knocking at the ribs, coincides with the protagonist’s feelings. In fact, the physiological
event is not a mere symptom, but a manifestation of mental disorder. There is also a
pronounced cognitive dimension in the passage, in the form of self-observation and self-
diagnosis. Macbeth feels an emotion and simultaneously perceives it as a manifestation
of the body.
An examination of modernist poetry could lead to the result that there are poets like
T. S. Eliot and Wallace Stevens who tend to write ‘disembodied ‘ poetry, i. e. poetry
that is averse to embodied cognition, while others like Ezra Pound and William Carlos
William are in favour of embodied cognition. As early as 1988 Max Nänny wrote an
article on Ezra Pound as a “Right Brain Poet”. By way of analogy one could call T. S.
Eliot a left brain poet. But such classiVcations should be treated with caution from a
cognitive and historical point of view. As far as Eliot is concerned, his theory of the
“dissociation of sensibility” could be discussed in terms of the cognitive approach.
9 Conclusion
It may be objected that the material treated in this study is rather diversiVed and dis-
parate and that the evidence presented moves freely between genres and periods, but as
an extenuating circumstance it can be pointed out that an innovative approach is tried
out in this contribution, which opens new perspectives and is waiting to be substan-
tiated in a more comprehensive and systematic procedure. Some results can at least be
ascertained. Emotion and motion have turned out to be two sides of a coin. Motion
is understood as the kinesthetic experience of the body, which comes into play with
any emotional experience, no matter whether in real life or Vction, although the liter-
ary artist has aesthetic strategies at his or her disposal which make possible intensiVed
representation of emotion. Analyses have shown that literature is a veritable Veld for
experimentation in matters of embodied cognition. Embodied cognition could be iden-
tiVed in the representation of facial feedback, both in views from outside (external) and
from inside (internal). The thesis that emotion is closely linked to physical manifesta-
tion, that emotion is actually inseparable from motion has been conVrmed in numerous
examples from narrative prose and poetry. The application of the term “sensory-motor”
to cognitive phenomena represented in literature proved to have certain advantages,
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since it allows for the appreciation of diUerent aspects of body activity involved in cog-
nition (changes of the position of the body, movement of the limbs, facial expression,
smelling, taste), which could be found in the instances of represented emotion exam-
ined. It should be noteworthy and encouraging for cognitivists and neuroscientists
advocating sensory-motor concepts that in literature there is massive evidence for their
theories from times in which nobody as yet dreamed of neurons let alone sensory-motor
concepts. The interdisciplinary beneVt can be mutual, the literary scholar proVting from
the mind and brain scientist exploring hitherto unknown dimensions of human reality,
and the scientist learning that poets have all along known more about the mind’s con-
struction than they would have believed possible.
10 References
Adelmann, P. K. and R. B. Zajonc (1989). Facial EUerence and the Experience of Emotion.
Annual Review of Psychology, 40, 249–280.
Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 617–645.
Barsalou, L. W. (2010). Grounded cognition: Past, present, and future. Topics in Cognitive
Science, 2, 716–724.
Boulanger, V., Hauk, O. & F. Pulvermüller (2009). Grasping Ideas with the Motor System:
Semantic Somatotopy in Idiom Comprehension. Cerebral Cortex 19, 1905–1914.
Chandler, R. (1975). The Lady in the Lake. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Chandler, R .(1975). The Little Sister. Harmondsworth: Pengiun.
Crane, M. T. (2000). Shakespeare’s Brain: Reading with Cognitive Theory. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Crane, M. T. (2010). Analogy, Metaphor, and the New Science: Cognitive Science and
Early Modern Epistemology. In: Zunshine (Ed.), 103–114.
Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes’ Error. London: Penguin.
Damasio, A. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens. Body and Emotion in the Making of
Consciousness. New York, San Diego, London: Harcourt Brace.
Faulkner, W. (1971). Light in August. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Gallese, V. & G. LakoU (2005). The Brain’s Concepts: The Role of the Sensory-Motor
System in Reason and Language. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 22, 455–479.
Gibbs, R. W. J. (2005). Embodiment and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
79
Wolfgang G. Müller
Glenberg, A. M. & M. P. Paschak (2002). Grounding language in action. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 9, 558–565.
Hammett, D. (1975). The Glass Key. London and Sidney: Pan Books.
Hogan, P. C. (2010). On Being Moved: Cognition and Emotion in Literature and Film. In
Zunshine (Ed.), 237–256.
Hopkins, G. M. (1967). The Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins. London, New York,
Toronto: Oxford University Press.
Housman, A. E. (1933). The Name and Nature of Poetry. Cambridge: At the University
Press.
Keats, J. (1970). Poetical Works. London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
LakoU, G. & M. Johnson (1999). Philosophy in the Flesh. New York: Basic Books.
Meyer-Sickendiek, B. (2012). Lyrisches Gespür. Vom geheimen Sensorium moderner Poe-
sie. München: Fink.
Müller, Wolfgang G. (1981). Implizite Bewußtseinsdarstellung im behavioristischen Ro-
man der zwanziger und dreißiger Jahre: Hammett, Chandler, Hemingway, Amerika-
studien, 26, 193–211.
Nänny, Max (1988). Ezra Pound: Right Brain Poet. Paideuma, 17.2/3 (Fall/Winter),
93–109.
Niemeier, S. (2011). Culture-speciVc concepts of emotionality and rationality. In M.
Callies, W. R.
Keller & A. Lohöfer (Eds.), Bi-Drectionality in the Cognitive Sciences. Amsterdam, Phila-
delphia: Benjamins, 43–56.
Oately, K. (1992). Best Laid Schemes: The Psychology of Emotions. Cambridge etc.:
Cambridge University Press.
Oately, K. (1994). A taxonomy of the emotions of literary response and a theory of
identiVcation in Vctional narrative. Poetics, 23, 53–74.
Pezzulo, G., L. W. Barsalou, Cangelosi L. W., A., Fischer, M.A., McRae, K. & M. Spivey
(2011). The mechanics of embodiment: A dialogue on embodiment and computa-
tional modeling. Frontiers in ognition, 2(5), 1–21.
RatcliUe, M. (2008). Feelings of Being. Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of
Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Richardson, A. (2010). Facial Expression Theory from Romanticism to the Present. In
Zunshine (Ed.), 65–83.
Schrott, R. & A. Jacobs (2011). Gehirn und Gedicht. Wie wir unsere Wirklichkeiten kon-
struieren. Hamburg: Hanser Verlag.
80
Motion and Emotion
Shakespeare, W. (2005). Hamlet. Englisch-deutsche Studienausgabe. Ed. N. Greiner, W.
G. Müller. Tübingen: StauUenburg Verlag.
Shakespeare, W. (1971). Macbeth. Ed. K. Muir. Arden Edition. London: Methuen.
Shelley, P. B. (1970). Poetical Works. London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University
Press.
Starr, G. (2010). Multisensory Imagery. In Zunshine (Ed.), 275–291.
Stockwell, P. (2002). Cognitive Poetics. London, New York: Routledge.
Williams, W. C. (1951). The Collected Later Poems. New York: New Directions.
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,
9, 625–636.
Wolman, B. B., Ed. (1973). Handbook of General Psychology. Englewood CliUs: Prentice-
Hall.
Zunshine, L. (2006). Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel. Columbus:
Ohio State University Press.
Zunshine, L., Ed. (2010). Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press.
81
